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and redistribution or the transfer of owner-
ship rights to the tiller has been the focal point
of the land reform program in the Philippines.
This transfer was envisioned to result in a sig-
nificant shift in income and productivity in the agrarian sec-
tor. While some equalization of incomes may have indeed
occurred, the full benefits of this asset transfer, however,
have not been realized.
Why? There can be several reasons but in recent years, the
problem of property rights has been the focal issue. True,
land reform might have provided the tillers with access and
ownership to agricultural lands but said lands were practi-
cally “dead capital/asset” because the property rights over
them are “imperfect” due to regulatory and bureaucratic
impediments.
This Notes traces the roots of the problem of property rights
in land reform areas and looks into their implications.
The land redistribution process: progress
and problems
Land redistribution involves the state’s (a) acquisition of
private agricultural lands, (b) proclamation of public lands
as alienable and disposable, and (c) subdivision and award
of nonprivate agricultural lands to identified beneficiaries.
Private lands include lands owned by private individuals or
corporations and lands titled to specific government agen-
cies/corporations, including government-owned banks. The
acquisition of private lands can be compulsory or voluntary,
i.e., agricultural lands identified by the government for land
reform will be subject to redistribution whether an owner
submits the land for coverage or not. On the other hand,
public lands are state lands and require proclamation as
alienable and disposable (A&D) before they can be distrib-
uted for private ownership. A&D lands which have not yet
been titled to any entity but are managed by government
agencies are held as nonprivate agricultural lands or govern-
ment lands such as resettlements, landed estates and others.
The land redistribution program has been implemented in
phases. The first land reform law was enacted in 1963 but
land redistribution on a national scale only began in 1972
with the passage of the Land Reform Act (Presidential De-
cree 27) for rice and corn lands. In 1988, a comprehensive
agrarian reform law (CARL) was enacted which expanded
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the coverage of land reform to include all other types of
agricultural lands regardless of crop or fruit produced and
tenurial arrangement.1 Land acquisition and distribution was
envisioned to be completed in a period of 10 years begin-
ning June 1988 but so far, only less than two-thirds of lands
covered by the reform program have been distributed.
Several problems caused the delay in the implementation
of the program. These were in the following areas: (1) iden-
tification of beneficiaries and actual coverage of the reform;
(2) land valuation; and (3) land titling.
Identification of beneficiaries and coverage
The process of land redistribution starts with the identifica-
tion of the lands and owners to be covered by land reform.
It involves the conduct of a joint field survey by the Depart-
ment of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Environ-
ment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the LandBank.2
DAR also simultaneously draws up the lists of beneficiaries
which consist of people working on the land and are physi-
cally present in the area. However, this is a difficult task
because there are no updated lists of farming households
in barangays. Obtaining the names of seasonal and other
farm workers is even more difficult since most often, these
workers live in different sitios or municipalities. Information
on the tenants, farm workers and tillers has been imperfect
and has led to conflicts between the landowner and benefi-
ciary (i.e., landowners consider some beneficiaries as squat-
ters instead of tenant/worker) or among tenants.
Another source of conflict is the actual area to be covered
by land reform. This stems from conflicts in the retention
limits of landowners and heirs and from problems in land
use regulations.
The land reform law allows owners to retain land up to seven
hectares for rice and corn land and five hectares for other
agricultural lands. In addition, each heir is allocated an area
of up to three hectares. The law also allows the owners and
heirs to choose the areas to be retained but the beneficiary
is given the option to choose whether to remain in the area
or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land
(Sec.6 RA6657). Identification and measurement of the area
to be retained, however, has become a problem despite the
conduct of a survey. Patents (EPs or CLOAs)3 have appar-
ently been distributed for lands covering retained areas of
owners/heirs. The presence of this problem is reflected in
pending cases at the DAR courts which include significant
conflicts on retention limit.4
Poor land use planning in the country has also created diffi-
culties in identifying the actual coverage of land reform. A
study by Silva (1993) noted that Town Plans of municipali-
ties cannot be used as guide for development. These Plans
are merely physical plans for built-up areas with little atten-
tion given to areas outside of the town proper. Moreover,
the Town Plans have been considered technically deficient
with the land allocation criteria applied not based on well-
conceived and valid guidelines.
Thus, in many areas, the extent allocated for nonagricul-
tural uses has often been in excess of what was needed
and the bulk of land zoned as nonagricultural is either used
for agriculture or is idle. In the implementation of the CARP,
there have been areas identified as covered by land reform
but are being contested because these areas have been
zoned as nonagricultural lands. On the other hand, areas
zoned for agriculture use have become urbanizing lands and
are thus potential areas for land use conversion. Land use
issues, i.e., conversion, exemption, coverage, protected
areas, are among the main reasons for cases filed on land
reform, constituting about 16 percent of the cases currently
pending at the DAR.
Land valuation
Lands distributed to tillers or farm workers may be com-
pensable or noncompensable. Public lands and nonprivate
_______________
1A 10-year moratorium was provided to commercial farms uti-
lized for aquaculture, livestock and poultry farming.
2DAR and the DENR are the key government agencies involved
in the land reform program. DAR is the overseer while DENR
complements DAR by taking the task of redistribution of public
lands.
3Patents are titles of ownership. Emancipation Patents (EPs) are
provided to beneficiaries of the land reform law of 1972 while the
Certificates of Land Ownership and Acquisition (CLOAs) are those
given to beneficiaries under the 1988 agrarian reform program (CARL
or RA 6657).
4About one third of pending cases at DAR courts as of 2003 are
due to conflicts in retention limits. Some cases though may have
been filed even prior to the issuance of EPs or CLOAs.No. 2003-14 3
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agricultural lands are noncompensable, implying that gov-
ernment subsidizes the cost of land and beneficiaries pay
only some administrative costs. On the other hand, privately
owned agricultural lands are compensable and beneficia-
ries have to pay government the cost of acquiring the land.5
The agrarian reform law provides that payment for private
agricultural lands shall be based on “just compensation.”
Just compensation implies that valuation is based on a num-
ber of indices like the cost of acquisition of the land, the
current value of like properties, actual use and income, sworn
valuation of the owner, tax declaration, and assessment
made by government assessors. These indices have been
subject to significant bargaining tactics and valuation has
never been transparent (Adriano 1994). The system has
also been used by landowners to delay implementation and
tended to corrupt the bureaucracy.
Majority of landowners in fact (57 percent of those surveyed
in 1992) have rejected the valuation of their land assessed
by the government and have lodged appeals in special agrar-
ian courts. Results of such appeals have generally been in
favor of the landowners (Adriano 1994).
Land titling
The formalization of property rights in the country is sup-
ported by a land registry system that includes the recording
or registration of property titles with the Land Registration
Authority (LRA). Such registration is critical since it signifies
the state’s recognition and guarantee over the individual’s/
corporation’s property rights. This same principle on prop-
erty registration has been applied on lands redistributed
under land reform. However, the registration process has
been complicated.
First, land titles in the form of EPs or CLOAs have been
registered and distributed even prior to the acceptance of
the landowner of the valuation or payment in full,6 thereby
creating conflicts and confusion. When the Supreme Court
(SC) reversed this procedure in an administrative order in
1990, stating that landowners must be paid first prior to
the registration of titles, said SC decision, however, created
a setback in the immediate transfer of land. Thus, a com-
promise was reached wherein the registration of CLOAs/
EPs proceeded and a deposit account in the name of the
landowner was created by the LandBank.7 In cases where
conflicts arise in the coverage of CARP and the courts rule
in favor of the landowner, registered and distributed EPs/
CLOAs can be withdrawn.
A second complication is that the agrarian reform program
allowed the issuance of collective CLOAs.8 A collective CLOA
signifies collective ownership, with the formation or regis-
tration of an organization (or cooperative) being required.
The title (or mother CLOA) is issued in the name of the
farmer’s organization or cooperative. This scheme allows
for easier registration of titles since the transfer is only made
to one juridical entity and a subdivision survey is not needed.
However, while each beneficiary has been assigned an area,
the actual size has yet to be verified. Moreover, the collec-
tive CLOAs have been issued mainly to farmer’s organiza-
tions with members acting individually rather than function-
ing as cooperatives. With the title being collective, no one
member can sell, mortgage or use as collateral the title to
obtain a loan or capital in the formal market. About 18 per-
cent of the CLOAs issued are collective titles which cover an
area of about 1.6 million hectares or 46 percent of the total
land area awarded under the land reform programs.
Other forms of land transfers
The transfer or conveyance of lands acquired through the
land reform program is allowed by law but restricted by the
following land regulations: (a) transfers, mortgaging or any
_______________
5There is, however, an option for a voluntary land transfer (VLT)
agreement whereby the landowner and tenant(s) agree to a direct
purchase. The land is not purchased by government but is trans-
ferred to the tenant/beneficiary who agrees to pay the landowner
directly based on a contract, the terms and condition to be approved
by the DAR.
6EPs and CLOAs like Transfer of Certificate Titles (TCTs) are
recognized as legal titles to land. These titles indicate that lands have
been acquired through the land and agrarian reform programs. When
such lands are transferred by the awardee to a transferee by virtue of
inheritance or sale, TCTs are issued by the LRA (DAR AO 8 s. 1995).
7The title of the landowner is not cancelled but only annotated
stating that the land is covered by CARP and the names of the ben-
eficiaries of the land are indicated in the title.
8The issuance of collective patents has been applied only to
land redistributed under the CARP (RA 6657). The earlier land re-
form law (PD 27) does not have this feature (i.e., there are no collec-
tive EPs).November 2003 4
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form of conveyance are not allowed within 10 years of award
and upon full payment of purchase price; (b) ceiling of land
ownership of agricultural lands is pegged at five hectares;
and (c) only qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries as iden-
tified by DAR and the LandBank can buy awarded lands.
Despite these regulations, however, buying, selling and other
forms of transfers have taken place in significant numbers.
Some farmers have in fact accumulated agricultural land-
holdings beyond the five-hectare ceiling on ownership. Re-
cording these transfers, however, has not been easy be-
cause in some areas, such transfers have not been openly
acknowledged. In other areas, though, these transactions
are socially acceptable and in many cases, have been for-
malized and legalized through informal channels of land reg-
istration (David 2003).
A common form of transfer that has emerged in the agrar-
ian areas is land pawning. In a pawning arrangement, the
pawnee (lender) takes over the cultivation of the land until
the loan is repaid. The terms of the loan are highly variable,
i.e., interest rate ranges from 20 to 50 percent (Nagarajan
1989; Fukui 1995); loan amounts per hectare differ de-
pending on the need and productivity of the land; and the
loan contract may last from one year to more than 10 years.
Pawning of land has apparently emerged as an arrangement
in the informal credit market to obtain long-term loans.
Several studies noted the extent of selling, buying and pawn-
ing in agrarian areas. A 1994 study by DAR covering 23
provinces showed that the proportion of EP recipients, who
sold, pawned or “illegally” transacted lands acquired through
land reform ranged from 7 to 74 percent per village (Table
1). Among holders of CLOA titles, the proportion of recipi-
ents transacting their lands ranged from 2 to 100 percent
in the 16 provinces sampled. The 2003 survey of 11 palay
and coconut villages in four provinces also indicated the
prevalence of selling and pawning of agrarian reform-awarded
lands. The percentage of agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs)
who sold their awarded land varied from seven percent in
the Quezon villages to 56 percent in a village in Laguna
(Table 2).
It is important to note that pawning and selling transactions
are supported by formal written contracts, witnessed by
barangay or village officials and sometimes performed by
lawyers. Some pawning arrangements involve the annota-
tion of titles in the Registry of Deeds and most selling ar-
rangements are also formalized and documented in the
Registry of Deeds.
Typology of property rights in land reform areas
The implementation of land reform in the country has given
rise to “insecure” property rights in agrarian areas partly
because of the unfinished land acquisition and distribution
program and partly due to prohibitions in the transfer of
awarded lands. These rights may be categorized on the basis
of the legitimacy and ownership claims on land. Some rights
are relatively tradeable than others because the legality of
ownership has been established.
In general, as shown in Figure 1, beneficiaries who have
obtained individual titles to lands acquired under land re-
form whereby landowners have been paid (in case of private
lands) can claim full or absolute legal ownership rights. On
the other hand, there are beneficiaries who received titles
but ownership needs to be verified or are being contested in
courts. Thus, while these rights are strictly legal, they are
contingent on future decisions or actions. So far, there is
no summary documentation of how much of the awarded
lands are contestable but their presence hampers the effi-
cacy of the rural land market.
Pawning and land lease rights that could have emerged
because of land regulations and limited development of the
rural credit market, have contingent ownership claims. These
forms of transfers are “illegal” based on agrarian laws but
are widely practiced. In some cases, pawning contracts have
been legitimized through informal channels of land registra-
tion. There is no effort (or it is costly) to monitor these
exchanges. Many transactions are covered only by verbal or
informal contracts and the risk of losing land rights is high
since contracting parties have limited legal protection in
cases of conflict.
Policy implications
What do all these developments in the agrarian areas im-
ply? It is clear to note that the extent of those having inse-
cure property rights is quite significant in the land reform
areas. This situation has thus constrained the transferabil-
ity or tradeability of agrarian lands. As such, it is importantNo. 2003-14 5
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for the government to address the regulatory and bureau-
cratic impediments that have given rise to insecure rights.
In particular, increasing the transferability of land reform
awarded lands would legitimize the use of more efficient
contractual arrangements. For instance, land leasing which
may take the form of fixed rentals or sharecropping arrange-
ments may provide a better alternative for farmers with little
capital, family labor or draft power to operate the land or for
farmers who have better access to nonland-based livelihood
opportunities. This arrangement would also allow the land-
less, marginal farmers to gain access to land. Moreover, if
there were less restrictions on land transfers, more accept-
able land-pawning arrangements where cultivation rights are
not lost but where forfeiture clauses instead are agreed
upon, may emerge as a new scheme of things (David 2003).
Better governance may also result from the lifting of restric-
tions on the transferability of awarded lands. Documenta-
tion of agriculture land ownership has become distorted
because transactions have not been transparent. With the
removal of the restrictions in the tradeability of agrarian
lands, transactions on land will be more transparent, records
Table 1. Number of recipients of emancipation patents (EPs) and Certificates of Land
Ownership Awards (CLOAs) and percentage of those with transactions in selected
villages in 23 provinces, 1994
  % recipient with transaction
EP CLOA
Provincea All Selling Mortgaging Othersb All Selling Mortgaging Othersb
          
Pangasinan 8.0 7.8 0.6 - 5.6 - 1.9 3.7 
Isabela 25.7 16.1 8.3 2.3 21.4 - 7.1 14.3 
Pampanga 6.8 1.7 1.7 3.4   
Nueva Ecija 23.0 12.7  7.1  4.8 28.6 25.7  2.9 -
Bulacan 7.7 6.0 1.7 -  
Quezon I 87.1 12.6  2.9  71.7 38.6 1.1  11.4 35.2 
Quezon II 100.0 - - 100.0 
Cavite 44.1 44.1 - - 16.7 16.7  - -
Laguna 61.0 61.1 - - 100.0 100.0  - -
Sorsogon 13.9 - 13.9 -  
Camarines Sur 8.6 - 6.0  2.6 7.0 - 7.0 -
Negros Occidental 13.5 - - 13.5 18.0 - - 18.0 
Antique 21.1 6.6 14.5  - 9.5 - 7.1 2.4 
Bohol 4.0 0.8 1.6 1.6 5.3 - 2.6 2.6 
Negros Orriental 20.0 0.7  17.2  2.1 1.8 0.2  1.3 0.2 
Leyte 74.1 11.1 63.0  - 21.3 21.3 - -
Zambonga del Sur 50.0 2.4  47.6  -  
Bukidnon 25.6 6.2 11.6  7.8   
Agusan del Sur 6.9 6.9  - - 36.4 27.3 - 9.1 
South Cotabato 10.1 - 7.9  2.2   
Davao del Norte 16.1 8.6  - 7.5 8.3 6.5  1.9 -
North Cotabato 9.3 5.7  3.6  - 13.3 13.3 - -
Lanao del Norte 19.1 10.9  8.2  -  
  
Average 17.2 7.2 7.0 3.3 26.5 20.1 1.9 5.0
aRows show data for a village in the province indicated.  Sampled villages in each province are different for EP and CLOA recipients.
 Only 16 villages were sample for CLOA beneficiaries.
bIncludes transfer of rights, leasing abandonment and waiving of rights.
Source: Department of Agrarian Reform. 1994. A Study of the extent, nature and causes of illegal transactions and violations of EP/
CLOA recipient in selected sites of the SOPs and non-SOPs. Policy and Strategic Research Service, DAR.November 2003 6
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Figure 1. Typology of property rights in land
reform areas
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of ownership of agricultural lands reconciled, corruption in
the bureaucracy lessened and the way for the implementa-
tion of a progressive land tax would be easier.      
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Nueva Ecija  
Bakal II 189 39.7 18.0 
Maragol 145 15.2 12.4
Gabaldon 100 21.0 8.0 
Pinili 128 14.1 13.3
Laguna  
Tubuan 23 21.7 13.0
 Masapang 43 55.8 -a
Quezon  
Sta. Catalina Sur 298 6.7 7.4 
San Isidro 137 6.6 2.9
Iloilob  
Pandan 39 - 10.2
Rizal 7 14.3 14.3
Signe 7  - -
aUsing more detailed farm survey results indicated that 35 percent of
sample farm household (or 16% of their area) have pawned out in this village.
bIn these villages there are more leaseholders than ARBs.
Source: C. David et al. 2003. Table 4.1a. Land reform and land market
transactions in the Philippines. Terminal Report. Philippine
Institute for Development Studies.